Tool/software:
I'm developing a new PKi-based service for Sitara secure boot. This would include everything from initial SBL, u-boot and yocto.
I noticed in the restricted documentation that it mentions PKI, but in diagrams its says that it simply compares the firmware public key to one in eFuse. That is clearly not PKI!
In PKI there is a root of trust, and that should have nothing direct to do with used boot keys.
So is the boot PKI or not? Is there a way to evaluate the chain of trust in SBL, or is this just using X.509 format for "wannabe PKI"?
The use case would be that we'd want to burn a Root CA certificate to eFuse, and use a software signing certificate, signed by an intermediate CA to issue the keys for each firmware release.
I'm sure we can sort it from u-boot forwards, but that leaves the SBL open. -> Boot is not that secure.
Best,
//HS